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THE MONOPOLY MYTH AND OTHER TALES
ABOUT THE SUPERIORITY OF LAWYERS
Leslie C. Levin*
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. legal profession’s so-called monopoly on the practice of law is
under siege.1 The monopoly depends on barriers to entry such as costly
legal education, character and fitness inquiries, and other licensing
requirements that are under sustained attack.2 These barriers not only limit
entry to the profession, but also are used to justify the profession’s claim of
technical and moral superiority over nonlawyer providers of legal services.
At the same time, the legal profession’s privileged status is also eroding, as
laws that prohibit the unauthorized practice of law by nonlawyers are
(slowly) being rewritten to permit nonlawyers to provide legal services to
individuals in a variety of contexts.3 Individuals are also increasingly
turning to other legal information providers so that they can represent
themselves both in and out of court.
In some ways, the surprise is not that the monopoly is eroding, but rather,
that it has taken so long. Calls in the United States to permit nonlawyers to
provide more legal services date back more than thirty-five years.4 In many
countries, legal services are not provided by a single group of professionals,
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. I am grateful to Richard
Moorhead and Laurel Terry for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. In fact, the profession’s conduct can more accurately be likened to a cartel than a
monopoly. Deborah Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 n.7 (1981).
Nevertheless, the term “monopoly” will be used here in its colloquial sense to mean that the
profession controls most of the market for legal services.
2. See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012); William C. Kidder,
The Bar Examination and the Dream Deferred: A Critical Analysis of the MBE, Social
Closure, and Racial and Ethnic Stratification, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 547 (2004); Deborah
L. Rhode, Moral Character As a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491 (1985).
3. See infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
4. Ralph Cavanagh & Deborah Rhode, The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se
Divorce: An Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104, 165 (1976); see also Roger Hunter &
Robert Klonoff, A Dialogue on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 25 VILL. L. REV. 6, 21–
22, 37 (1979); Quintin Johnstone, The Unauthorized Practice Controversy, A Struggle
Among Power Groups, 4 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 55 (1955) (suggesting this approach). By 1986,
an American Bar Association report noted, “It can no longer be claimed that lawyers have
the exclusive possession of the esoteric knowledge required and are therefore the only ones
able to advise clients on any matter concerning the law.” AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON
PROFESSIONALISM, “. . . . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE”: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE
REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 52 (1986).
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but rather by a variety of providers who perform different functions. One
frequent line of demarcation has been between legal professionals who
appear in court and those who provide other legal services. For example, in
Japan, there are six different providers of legal services ranging from
bengoshi, who appear in court, to jun horitsuka (quasi-lawyers) such as
social insurance labor consultants.5 In the United Kingdom, where
barristers and some solicitors appear in court, nonlawyers—such as advice
agencies—provide legal services to individuals outside of court.6
In the United States, lawyers have struggled to maintain their privileged
status as providers of legal services. Although those efforts predated the
American Revolution, 1870 to 1920 was the seminal period in the legal
profession’s campaign to prevent the practice of law by nonlawyers.7 Elite
lawyers formed bar associations and embarked on the professional project,
that is, the effort by lawyers to attain market monopoly, social status, and
autonomy.8 The organized bar undertook to raise admission standards by
requiring formal legal education, bar examinations, and character and
fitness requirements to signal that lawyers possessed the technical expertise
and moral fiber to be viewed as a profession and to be entrusted with legal
work.9 Bar associations also created lawyer disciplinary processes, in part
to convey to the public that lawyers were trustworthy and capable of selfregulation.10
Since then, the bar and the courts have used the rhetoric of public
protection to justify the claim that only lawyers should be permitted to
provide legal services to the public.11 They contend that lawyers’ formal
5. See Kyoko Ishida, The Growing Influences of “Lawyer Substitutes” on Citizens’
Access to Legal Services, 27 WASEDA BULL. COMP. L. 15, 15, 24–25 (2007).
6. See Key Facts About the Citizens Advice Service, CITIZENS ADVICE BUREAU,
http://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/index/aboutus/cab_key_facts.htm (last visited Apr. 26,
2014); We’re Here To Help You, COUNCIL LICENSED CONVEYANCERS, http://www.clcuk.org/consumers.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (describing subject areas in which advice
or assistance is provided).
7. Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really
Make Good Neighbors—or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 159, 166–69,
186.
8. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 20, 25 (1989); TERENCE C. HALLIDAY,
BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT 67–68
(1987); MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS 49–50 (1977); Robert W. Gordon, The Legal Profession, in LOOKING BACK AT
LAW’S CENTURY 287, 294–97 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002).
9. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS
272, 287, 361 (1950); Christensen, supra note 7, at 175–77; Johnstone, supra note 4, at 5.
10. HALLIDAY, supra note 8, at 69–72; MICHAEL J. POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO
PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION 24–
28 (1988).
11. See, e.g., Lowell Bar Ass’n v. Loeb, 52 N.E.2d 27, 31 (Mass. 1943) (explaining that
the justification for excluding nonlawyers from the practice of law was “found, not in the
protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised
and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons”); see also Richmond
Ass’n of Credit Men v. Bar Ass’n, 189 S.E. 153, 157 (Va. 1937); In re Coop. Law Co., 92
N.E. 15, 16 (N.Y. 1910); John G. Jackson et al., Report of the Special Committee on
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 57 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 562, 564 (1932); Report of the Standing
Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 66 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 268 (1941).
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training, moral character, and commitment to professional ideals help
ensure public protection.12 This can be seen in the 1969 American Bar
Association’s (ABA) Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which
explains that the “prohibition against the practice of law by a layman is
grounded in the need of the public for integrity and competence of those
who undertake to render legal services.”13 Unlike nonlawyers, who “are
not governed as to integrity or legal competence,” lawyers are subject to
regulation and “also [are] committed to high standards of ethical
conduct.”14 Similar claims about the technical and moral superiority of
lawyers continue to the present.15 But as a practical matter, the credentials
required to become a lawyer (i.e., a graduate law degree and passage of a
bar examination) “often far exceed the skills demanded.”16 There is also
scant evidence that lawyers are more effective or trustworthy than
nonlawyer providers of certain legal services.
The monopoly is problematic not simply because lawyers are unfairly
advantaged in the marketplace for legal services. It contributes to a more
fundamental problem: many poor, near-poor, and middle-class individuals
cannot afford a lawyer. The scope and consequences of this problem have
been eloquently described elsewhere.17 But, in essence, to qualify for free
legal services, an individual must be extremely poor.18 And even among
those who qualify for free legal services, less than one in five receive the
legal assistance they need.19 While attorneys annually provide millions of

12. Christensen, supra note 7, at 188; Jackson et al., supra note 11, at 564.
13. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-1 (1969). It further states that
because of “the inherently complex nature of our legal system, the public can better be
assured of the requisite responsibility and competence if the practice of law is confined to
those who are subject to the requirements and regulations imposed upon members of the
legal profession.” Id.
14. Id. EC 3-3.
15. See, e.g., Jean Cotton, Legal Technicians Aren’t the Answer: The Family Law
Section’s Executive Committee Weighs In, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, July 2008, at 30, 32 (stating
that “[a]llowing inexpert non-lawyers to practice the complex specialty of family law poses a
risk to the public that cannot be ignored”); Mike France, Bar Chiefs Protect the Guild: A
Lobbying Blitz Engulfs an ABA Panel on Non-lawyer Practice, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 7, 1995, at
A1, A28.
16. ABEL, supra note 8, at 21.
17. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical
Evidence, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 51, 52–60 (2010); Gillian K. Hadfield, Summary of
Testimony: Task Force To Expand Access to Civil Legal Services in New York, RICHARD
ZORZA’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE BLOG (Oct. 1, 2012), http://richardzorza.files.wordpress.com/
2012/10/hadfield-testimony-october-2012-final-2.pdf.
18. To qualify for Legal Services Corporation–funded services, a family of four
typically can only earn up to 125 percent of the poverty level, or $29,438. Fact Sheet on the
Legal Services Corporation, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/about/what-is-lsc (last
visited Apr. 26, 2014).
19. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT
UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 3 (2009), available at
http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/documenting_the_justice_gap_in_america_2
009.pdf. The New York Legal Aid Society was able to help only one out of nine New
Yorkers who sought its help with civil legal problems. THE TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS
TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVS. IN N.Y., REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
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hours of pro bono legal services,20 these efforts have proved inadequate to
meet the needs of individuals who cannot afford legal representation.
Indeed, even if every lawyer in the country performed 100 hours of pro
bono work annually, it would not fill the enormous gap in the need for legal
services.21 This has led to a significant access to justice problem for
millions of individuals who cannot afford a lawyer to represent them in
important matters involving their most basic legal needs. It has also led to a
crisis in many courts as they attempt to address the needs of selfrepresented litigants who are unfamiliar with legal forms and proceedings.22
This access to justice problem raises the urgent and obvious question: why
should lawyers’ near monopoly of the legal services market continue?
This Article considers the evidence concerning whether lawyers are
superior to nonlawyer legal services providers in the results they obtain in
certain legal matters, and the psychological and other evidence concerning
whether lawyers are—or are likely to be—more trustworthy. The
comparison focuses on whether lawyers are superior to nonlawyer
representatives who are permitted to provide legal services (e.g., workers’
compensation representatives) rather than to illegal providers (e.g.,
notarios). If lawyers are more effective or more ethical, then the legal
profession’s monopoly of the legal services market can be justified, at least
in part, on the grounds that it helps to protect the public. If lawyers are not
superior, then it is difficult to justify some of the current limitations on
nonlawyer practice, especially when so many individuals cannot afford to
hire a lawyer.
This Article begins in Part I with a description of the current U.S. legal
services market, which is dominated by lawyers, but also includes
nonlawyers who provide legal services in many contexts. Part II describes
the empirical evidence concerning the effectiveness of nonlawyer legal
services providers. The evidence suggests that experienced nonlawyers can
provide competent legal services in certain contexts and in some cases, can
seemingly do so as effectively as lawyers. Part III looks at the question of
whether lawyers are more trustworthy or “ethical” than nonlawyer
providers of legal services.
It considers the effectiveness of the
requirements imposed on lawyers that are thought to increase their
trustworthiness (e.g., legal education and the character and fitness inquiry)

38 (2010), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/access-civil-legal-services/PDF/CLSTaskForceREPORT.pdf.
20. PRO BONO INST., 2012 REPORT ON THE LAW FIRM PRO BONO CHALLENGE 1
(2013), available at http://www.probonoinst.org/wpps/wp-content/uploads/2012-Law-FirmChallenge-Report.pdf.
21. Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of
the Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 152
(2010).
22. See, e.g., THE TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVS. IN N.Y.,
supra note 19, at 1; U.S. BANKR. COURT CENT. DIST. OF CAL., ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN CRISIS:
SELF-REPRESENTED PARTIES AND THE COURT 1–3, 8–9 (2011), available at http://ecfciao.cacb.uscourts.gov/Communications/prose/annualreport/2011/ProSeAnnual%20Report2
011.pdf.
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and also explores whether lawyers’ psychological characteristics are likely
to make them more trustworthy than nonlawyer legal services providers.
Part IV discusses the implications of the existing research. It notes that
since there is little evidence that lawyers are more effective at providing
certain legal services or more ethical than qualified nonlawyers, the primary
justification for the legal profession’s monopoly of the legal services
market does not hold up to scrutiny. Instead, the public would be better
served if more nonlawyer representatives—who were subject to educational
and licensing requirements—could provide more legal services to the
public.
I. THE MONOPOLY MYTH AND THE U.S. LEGAL SERVICES MARKET
Lawyers are not the only providers of legal services in the United States.
Accountants routinely give tax advice, which is based on complex tax law
and regulations.23 Realtors handle real estate closings in many states.24
Nonlawyers also represent individuals in many federal agencies. For
instance, nonlawyer patent agents admitted to the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office prepare and file complex patent applications.25
Nonlawyer accredited representatives recognized by the Board of
Immigration Appeals represent individuals in immigration proceedings.26
Nonlawyers can represent individuals before the Department of Labor’s
Wage and Appeals Board.27 Many state agencies also permit nonlawyers to
represent parties in their proceedings.28
In most other circumstances, however, nonlawyers who are not working
under the supervision of lawyers are limited to selling and typing up legal
forms for self-represented individuals.29 Only a few states allow qualified
nonlawyers to provide additional assistance when they are operating on
their own. Certified legal document preparers in Arizona and legal
document assistants in California can help prepare legal documents for selfrepresented litigants and provide some general information, but they cannot
give legal advice.30 Immigration consultants in some states can help
immigrants complete forms, translate documents, and secure supporting
documents.31 Limited license legal technicians (LLLTs) in Washington can

23. See Christensen, supra note 7, at 204–05.
24. See id. at 197–98, 208, 210–11.
25. 37 C.F.R. § 11.6(b) (2013).
26. 8 C.F.R. § 1291.2(d) (2014). Accredited representatives must work for a qualified
nonprofit organization, but are not required to be supervised by a lawyer.
27. See 20 C.F.R. § 725.362(a), 725.363(b).
28. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT
WORK 11 (1998); see also infra note 154 and accompanying text.
29. See Catherine J. Lanctot, Scriveners in Cyberspace: Online Document Preparation
and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811, 829–30 (2002).
30. See ARIZ. CODE JUD. ADMIN. § 7-208(F)(1) (2007); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 6400(c) (West 2003). Unlawful detainer assistants can also help individuals complete
forms in eviction proceedings. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6400(a), (d).
31. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22441.
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help individuals with document preparation and provide legal advice in the
area of family law.32
The market for legal services also includes those who provide legal
services illegally. This practice is especially prevalent and problematic in
the area of immigration law. These nonlawyers, sometimes known as
notarios or immigration consultants, often live in neighborhoods populated
by immigrants.33 Notarios can put competitive pressure on lawyers because
they often charge less than lawyers and promise results that lawyers cannot
guarantee.34 Notarios are not trained in immigration law—which is
substantively complex—and their inaccurate advice can have devastating
consequences, including removal of their clients from the country in cases
where removal would not have otherwise occurred.
Finally, the market for legal services has been affected by the steep rise
in individuals who are engaging in self-representation either because they
cannot afford a lawyer or because they believe they can handle their legal
problems on their own.35 Both groups often rely on “do-it-yourself”
information that can be found in books, in courthouses, and on the internet.
The number of self-represented litigants in some courts is enormous. For
example, 98 percent of tenants in eviction cases in New York State are not
represented.36 Over 80 percent of divorce cases in some jurisdictions
involve one or more self-represented parties.37 Many self-represented
litigants also appear before state agencies in important legal matters, such as
cases involving denial or termination of subsistence benefits. The legal
profession has sought to address this increase in self-represented litigants
by allowing lawyers to provide limited scope representation (LSR) to
individuals who are otherwise representing themselves.
In LSR
arrangements, a lawyer and a client enter into an attorney-client relationship
in which they agree that the lawyer will only perform specific tasks (e.g.,
review or preparation of forms, legal research, preparation of evidence to

32. WASH.
ADMISSION
TO
PRACTICE
R.
28(F),
available
at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/?fa=court_rules.rulesPDF&groupName=ga&setName
=apr&pdf=1.
33. See Leslie C. Levin, Immigration Lawyers and the Lying Client, in LAWYERS IN
PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 87, 95 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather
eds. 2012).
34. See id.; Emily A. Unger, Note, Solving Immigration Consultant Fraud Through
Expanded Federal Accreditation, 29 LAW & INEQ. 425, 425–27 (2011).
35. See Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole Mott, Research on Self-Represented Litigation:
Preliminary Results and Methodological Considerations, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 163, 172–73
(2003); Bruce D. Sales et al., Is Self-Representation a Reasonable Alternative to Attorney
Representation in Divorce Cases?, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 553, 567 (1993).
36. THE TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVS. IN N.Y., supra note 19,
at 1, 17; see also Hannaford-Agor & Mott, supra note 35, at 169 (noting that in Cook
County, Illinois, neither party was represented by counsel in more than 90 percent of
eviction cases).
37. See, e.g., Lynn Mather & Craig A. McEwen, Client Grievances and Lawyer
Conduct: The Challenges of Divorce Practice, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE, supra note 33, at
63–64; Pro Se Statistics, NAT’L ASS’N CT. MGMT. (June 21, 2006), https://nacmnet.org/sites/
default/files/04Greacen_ProSeStatisticsSummary.pdf.
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present in court).38 In most jurisdictions, nonlawyers are not permitted to
perform these same functions for the public.
II. LAWYER VERSUS NONLAWYER PERFORMANCE
The conventional wisdom—and the vast majority of studies—indicate
that individuals who are represented by lawyers obtain better outcomes in
civil proceedings than those who are not.39 For example, 21 percent of
asylum seekers who were represented by counsel obtained relief as
compared to 1 percent who were not represented by counsel.40 Lawyer
representation in social security disability appeals increases the represented
party’s chances of success.41 Individuals represented by counsel in small
Represented parties obtain
claims courts enjoy better outcomes.42
significantly better financial results in cases tried before the Tax Court than
unrepresented parties.43
Although these findings align with our intuitions about the value of
counsel, their reliability has been seriously questioned because they are
mostly based on nonrandom observational studies of outcomes.44 The
problem with such studies is that a simple comparison of the outcomes in
cases where a client is represented by a lawyer and where an individual
self-represents cannot account for other factors that may affect outcomes,
including factors that affect whether a client will obtain a lawyer.45 For
instance, the ability to obtain legal representation may depend upon the
individual’s perseverance or articulateness or other characteristics that may
also be relevant to case outcomes.46 The ability to obtain counsel may also
38. See, e.g., Limited Scope Representation, CAL. COURTS: JUD. BRANCH CAL.,
http://www.courts.ca.gov/1085.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
39. See D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in
Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121
YALE L.J. 2118, 2175–81 (2012) (citing the studies).
40. FELINDA MOTTINO, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, MOVING FORWARD: THE ROLE OF
LEGAL COUNSEL IN NEW YORK CITY IMMIGRATION COURTS 40 (2000), available at
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/353.409747_MF.pdf#page=41&
zoom=auto,0,73.
41. KRITZER, supra note 28, at 114–16. But see William D. Popkin, The Effect of
Representation in Nonadversary Proceedings—A Study of Three Disability Programs, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1042 (1977) (“Attorneys are not helpful at the Social Security
reconsideration stage . . . .”).
42. See Austin Sarat, Alternatives in Dispute Processing: Litigation in a Small Claims
Court, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 339, 370 (1976); John Montague Steadman & Richard S.
Rosenstein, “Small Claims” Consumer Plaintiffs in the Philadelphia Municipal Court: An
Empirical Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1333 (1973).
43. See Leandra Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, Do Attorneys Do Their Clients Justice?
An Empirical Study of Lawyers’ Effects on Tax Court Litigation Outcomes, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1235, 1239 (2006). Represented parties, do not, however, seem to obtain
better outcomes in settled cases. Id.
44. See Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 39, at 2183–84.
45. Id. at 2188–95. In addition, a “simple” comparison of outcomes is often not possible
because the range of acceptable outcomes for clients is not binary. Some clients who
achieve an acceptable outcome may decide not to continue to pursue the outcome that is
being measured.
46. See id. at 2166–68; Sandefur, supra note 17, at 70.
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depend upon the strength of the client’s case, which may affect whether a
private lawyer would take the case on a contingent fee basis or whether a
legal services lawyer would view the case as worth the investment of office
resources.47 A straight comparison of outcomes cannot account for these
factors.
There have been a few randomized studies in which lawyer
representation was assigned to one group and compared to a control group
of unrepresented individuals. In one such study, tenants represented by
lawyers in Manhattan Housing Court had significantly better outcomes than
those who were not represented.48 Likewise, a study comparing the
outcomes achieved by summary eviction defendants in Massachusetts who
received traditional legal assistance from legal aid lawyers with outcomes
achieved by defendants who only attended instructional clinics run by a
legal aid attorney found that approximately two-thirds of the treated group
retained possession of their housing compared to one-third of the control
group.49 However, a randomized study of unemployment appeals claimants
found that representation by the Harvard Law School clinic had no
statistically significant effect on the probability that claimants would win
their appeals as compared to self-represented litigants.50 An older
randomized study of the impact of legal representation in juvenile courts
yielded mixed results.51 Thus, the randomized studies provide less robust
support for the view that individuals obtain better outcomes when
represented by lawyers.
Rebecca Sandefur’s analysis of mostly non-randomized studies suggests
that the procedural complexity of the matters may affect the degree of
differences in outcomes when individuals are represented by lawyers and
when they are not. When comparing outcomes in matters of below average
procedural complexity (e.g., welfare hearings), those represented by

47. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, Elements of Expertise: Lawyers’ Impact on Civil Trial
and Hearing Outcomes 8 n.iv (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
48. Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in
New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 419, 426–27 (2001). Only approximately 32 percent of the treatment group (which
was offered legal representation) had judgments entered against them as compared to 52
percent of the control group. Id. at 427.
49. D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized
Study in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV.
901, 908 (2013). In cases involving nonpayment of rent or other monetary counterclaims,
the treated group also obtained substantially more rent relief than the control group. Id. at
908–09.
50. Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 39, at 2124. The authors note that the win rate for
the control group was much higher than the win rate in the overall Massachusetts system and
suggested that the claimants in the control group (who had initiated contact with the Harvard
Clinic even though they did not ultimately receive legal representation from the clinic)
possessed personal characteristics making them more likely to win cases. Id. at 2173, 2175.
51. In one jurisdiction, legal representation in juvenile court significantly affected
outcomes while in another it did not. W. VAUGHAN STAPLETON & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, IN
DEFENSE OF YOUTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS 66–
68 (1972). One possible explanation for the disparity was because of differences between
the judges and procedures in the two jurisdictions. Id. at 155–58.
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attorneys were, on average, 40 percent more likely to win than those who
were self-represented.52 In fields of average procedural complexity in trial
courts, lawyer-represented individuals were, on average, 6.5 times more
likely to win than self-represented individuals.53 Lawyers’ potential impact
is also greater in adversarial fora (trial courts) than in simplified fora (e.g.,
small claims courts).54 Sandefur suggests that part of the reason individuals
do better when represented by lawyers may be because lawyers help
claimants navigate procedural complexity.55 The presence of lawyers may
also serve as an endorsement of a case’s merits and may encourage the
tribunal to follow the law and its own rules.56
There do not appear to be randomized studies involving nonlawyer
representatives.57 While non-randomized studies of case outcomes raise the
same methodological concerns described above,58 it is still instructive to
consider the studies that explore whether lawyers obtain better outcomes
than nonlawyer representatives. Taken together, the studies suggest there is
little evidence to support the legal profession’s claims of superiority as
compared to nonlawyer representatives in certain legal contexts.59
In the most systematic of the U.S. studies,60 Herbert Kritzer looked at
lawyer and nonlawyer representation in four types of civil proceedings in an
effort to answer the question: “Does it really matter whether an advocate

52. Sandefur, supra note 17, at 73.
53. Id.
54. Sandefur, supra note 47, at 26.
55. Sandefur, supra note 17, at 74; Sandefur, supra note 47, at 28.
56. See Sandefur, supra note 47, at 4, 29–30.
57. The closest is the Harvard study involving law clinic students. But the investigators
expressly discount the possibility that the failure to find a difference there between those
who were represented and those who were not was due to the fact that the students were not
lawyers. They point to the quality of the lawyer supervision and the high quality of
representation provided. Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 39, at 2172.
58. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. For example, lawyers may screen
out weak cases because they work on a contingent fee basis. Thus, lawyers’ success rate
may be higher than the success rates of nonlawyers, who do not work on a contingent fee
basis. See KRITZER, supra note 28, at 116.
59. See, e.g., infra notes 62–64, 70, 72 and accompanying text; see also Richard
Moorhead, Precarious Professionalism: Empirical and Behavioural Perspectives on
Lawyers, at 9–10 (March 6, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2407370. But see Sandefur, supra note 47, at 26–27
(reporting in a meta-analysis of several studies that individuals represented by lawyers were
more likely to prevail than if they were represented by nonlawyer advocates).
60. Earlier studies also explored these issues. A study of the Social Security hearing
system, which permits lay representation, found that “the contribution of counsel to the
accuracy, consistency, or timeliness of the decision process [was] indeterminable.
Everything hinges on the ability and attention of the representative.” JERRY L. MASHAW ET
AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION HEARING SYSTEM, at xxiv (1978). Individuals who were represented by
counsel before the Board of Veterans Appeals had a slightly higher ultimate success rate, as
compared to the success rate when service organizations represented individuals, and when
individuals were self-represented, but it was not clear whether these differences were
statistically significant. 1 LEGAL SERVS. CORP., SPECIAL LEGAL PROBLEMS AND PROBLEMS OF
ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVICES summary app., at A-12 to A-13 (1978). Lawyers who did not
specialize “were not useful” and were “irrelevant.” Id. at A-18 to A-19.

2620

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

has formal legal training?”61 He found that in unemployment compensation
appeals, experienced nonlawyer advocates could effectively represent
parties and that legal training did not ensure that an advocate would be
effective if the advocate was not familiar with the regulations or procedures
governing unemployment compensation appeals.62 In the social security
disability appeals context, attorneys were slightly more successful than
nonattorney representatives, probably because of the work of a small group
of highly effective attorneys who specialized in social security cases.63 In
the state labor grievance arbitration context, there were no statistically
significant differences between the outcomes when there was lawyer rather
than nonlawyer representation.64 In the tax appeals context, nonlawyer
representatives often lacked the procedural expertise to be as effective as
lawyers.65
Kritzer concluded that the “presence or absence of formal legal training
is less important than substantial experience with the setting.”66 Three
types of expertise were important: knowledge about the substantive law, an
understanding of the procedures, and familiarity with the regular players in
the process.67 Those who had experience with the forum were able to
obtain better results, because they knew the decision makers and were able
to tailor their presentations effectively.68
Similar findings about nonlawyer representatives have emerged from the
United Kingdom. A 1989 observational study found that in four
administrative tribunals (social security appeals, immigration hearings,
mental health review, and industrial tribunals), “a representative
significantly and independently increases the probability that appellants and
applicants will succeed with their case at a tribunal hearing.”69 Specialist
lay representation was as effective as representation by lawyers, except in
industrial tribunals.70 In all tribunals, specialization and expertise were
viewed as the most important qualifications for good representation and
those who specialized provided the greatest assistance to their clients.71
More recently, Moorhead, Paterson, and Sherr found, based on a review
of case files, the use of “model clients,” and client surveys, that nonlawyers
performed to higher standards than lawyers when providing representation
61. KRITZER, supra note 28, at 14.
62. Id. at 77.
63. Id. at 118–19, 143.
64. Id. at 171. In this context, an experienced nonlawyer had a high likelihood of
success against an inexperienced lawyer, and “[s]pecialist nonlawyers and specialist lawyers
appeared to be better advocates than non-specialist lawyers.” Id. at 185.
65. Id. at 109.
66. Id. at 201.
67. Id. at 203.
68. Id. at 196.
69. HAZEL GENN & YVETTE GENN, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF REPRESENTATION AT
TRIBUNALS: REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR 243 (1989).
70. See id. at 247. The analysis of the effects of representation in the industrial tribunals
was “fraught with difficulty” because of the high rate of prehearing settlements and the need
to consider both the applicant’s and the respondent’s representation. Id. at 87.
71. Id. at 245–47.
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in the areas of welfare benefits work, housing, and debt matters.72 The
likelihood of a solicitor getting a positive financial result in a welfare
benefit case was about a quarter of the likelihood of a nonlawyer agency,
and in employment cases, solicitors were about half as likely to get a
positive result as nonlawyer representatives.73 Peer review of files found
that where cases were handled by a solicitor’s firm rather than a nonlawyer
agency, the likelihood of a case being assessed as being handled below the
threshold of competency increased.74 Client surveys indicated that clients
were somewhat more satisfied with nonlawyer representatives, although
nonlawyers did less well with handling the initial client appointment.75
Overall, nonlawyers had “clients with slightly higher satisfaction ratings
and got significantly better results, and their work on cases was more likely
to be graded at higher levels of quality by experienced practitioners
working in their field.”76 Like some of the other studies, the findings
suggest that “specialization is usually more important than legal
qualifications in determining the quality of advocacy.”77
III. THE ETHICAL SUPERIORITY OF LAWYERS?
As noted, the bar also justifies its monopoly of the legal services market
with the argument that lawyers are more trustworthy (i.e., ethical) than
nonlawyers. Lawyers bolster their claim with references to their legal
training, their ethical code, the character and fitness inquiry, the lawyer
discipline system, and the threat of malpractice liability.78 It is not clear,
however, that these factors contribute significantly to the trustworthiness of
lawyers. For example, studies have not demonstrated that legal education
positively affects the moral development of lawyers.79 Law students learn

72. Richard Moorhead et al., Contesting Professionalism: Legal Aid and Nonlawyers in
England and Wales, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 765, 788–89, 795 (2003). For a description of
this and other studies showing that solicitor performance was not superior to nonsolicitor
performance, see Moorhead, supra note 59, at 9–10.
73. In the housing context, the situation is more mixed. Id. at 787.
74. Id. at 788.
75. Id. at 784–86, 791, 794.
76. Id. at 789.
77. Id. at 796; see also GENN & GENN, supra note 69, at 245–46.
78. E.g., AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY IN
LAW-RELATED SITUATIONS: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 163–64 (1995); Report of
the Standing Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, supra note 11, at 268; France,
supra note 15.
79. Maury Landsman & Steven P. McNeel, Moral Judgment of Law Students Across
Three Years: Influences of Gender, Political Ideology and Interest in Altruistic Law
Practice, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 891, 914 (2004) (reporting that assessments of law students’
moral judgments using the Defining Issues Test revealed that scores did not improve while
students were in law school); see also Thomas E. Willging & Thomas G. Dunn, The Moral
Development of the Law Student: Theory and Data on Legal Education, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC.
306, 354, 355 (1981) (showing no statistically significant change in moral reasoning of
students during law school). But see Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development
Through Experiential Teaching, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 505, 527 (1995) (reporting that
experientially taught professional responsibility courses significantly influenced students’
moral reasoning).
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about the Rules of Professional Conduct in law school—including the rules
concerning competence, confidentiality, and conflicts—but it is not known
how much this experience affects their ethical decisions in practice.80
This is not to say that the factors that the legal profession point to as
evidence of superior trustworthiness have no influence on lawyers’ conduct,
but rather that the significance of these factors is unproven—and may be
overstated. For example, the ambiguity of lawyers’ professional rules
permit lawyers to interpret their responsibilities in self-interested ways.81
Moreover, it is unclear whether lawyers’ rules of professional conduct
affect behavior any more than rules governing the conduct of any other
licensed profession. Likewise, the character and fitness inquiry, which is
intended to screen out those who lack the moral character to practice law,
has not been shown to do so. Very few bar applicants are denied admission
on character and fitness grounds and the information elicited during that
process (e.g., prior convictions, substance abuse) does not strongly predict
who will later be disciplined.82 Concerns about discipline sanctions shape
lawyer conduct in certain practice contexts,83 as does the threat of civil
liability, but it is not clear that they do so any more than in other regulated
industries (e.g., the securities industry). In other words, if nonlawyer
providers of legal services had a code of conduct and faced the threat of
sanctions or civil liability, their ethical behavior might be affected with
equal force.
As an empirical matter, the bar’s claim that lawyers are more trustworthy
than nonlawyer legal services providers is exceedingly difficult to test.
Much misconduct by lawyers and nonlawyer providers is undetected or
unreported, so the true extent is unknown. Even a comparison of
complaints against lawyers and nonlawyers is difficult as the complaints
can be made in different fora,84 and the ease of filing a complaint against
lawyers and nonlawyer providers of legal services differs considerably.85
Complaint information and sanctions involving lawyers are often not
80. See Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Firm Practitioners, 41
HOUS. L. REV. 309, 370 (2004) (reporting on the “disconnect” between the rules and the
realities of practice); see also Moorhead, supra note 59, at 34 (noting the lack of evidence of
the efficacy of prequalification ethical training in the United Kingdom).
81. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
82. Leslie C. Levin et al., The Questionable Character of the Bar’s Character and
Fitness Inquiry, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 2–3) (on file
with author). In Connecticut, for example, only one to two applicants a year are denied
admission. Id. (manuscript at 4 n.3). While some additional number of potential applicants
may be deterred from applying, that number is not known. Nor is it known whether those
who were deterred would have been untrustworthy lawyers. Id. (manuscript at 5 n.4).
83. See Levin, supra note 33, at 103–04.
84. Complaints against lawyers are made to lawyer discipline authorities, to courts, to
administrative agencies, and to prosecutors. Complaints against nonlawyer providers are
made to lawyer discipline authorities, to consumer protection and other administrative
agencies, to state attorneys general, and to prosecutors.
85. State discipline systems have made significant strides in publicizing how to file a
complaint against a lawyer. Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer
Discipline, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 20–21 (2007). It is much more difficult for the
public to determine how and where to complain about nonlawyer legal services providers.
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publicly available;86 it is even harder to find records of complaints or
discipline involving nonlawyer providers.87 Even when lawyers and
nonlawyer representatives operate in the same forum, comparisons are
difficult because the decisionmaker may apply different standards or
otherwise handle complaints against lawyers and nonlawyers differently.88
While direct comparisons of misconduct by lawyers and nonlawyer legal
services providers are not available, it is useful to consider whether there is
something about the personalities or psychological attributes of lawyers that
might make them more likely to behave in a trustworthy fashion than
others. As it turns out, lawyers’ decisionmaking processes have not been
shown to be different than the decisionmaking processes of other
individuals. Lawyers do differ, however, from the general public in their
personality traits and mental health in ways that may affect their ethical
behavior.
A. Psychological Characteristics of Law Students and Lawyers
The choice of profession is associated with specific personality types.89
On the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), which assesses personality
types, law students appear to prefer “thinking” (e.g., looking at the logical
consequences of a choice or action) over “feeling” (e.g., making decisions
based on values and what is important to them and to others).90 They are
also more likely to prefer “judging” (e.g., living in a planned, orderly way)
over “perceiving” (e.g., living in a flexible, spontaneous way).91
Law students may be somewhat more ethical than other graduate
students—but they are not that ethical. A small study that tested the moral
judgment of law students found that incoming first-year law students scored
higher than most other first-year graduate students.92 Unfortunately, their
judgment does not appear to improve during law school.93 Moreover, 45
percent of law students admitted to cheating in law school in the previous
year.94 While this is less than the 56 percent of graduate business students

86. See id. at 19–20.
87. See, e.g., Isabel Medina, The Challenges of Facilitating Effective Legal Defense in
Deportation Proceedings: Allowing Nonlawyer Practice of Law Through Accredited
Representatives in Removals, 53 S. TEX. L. REV. 459, 471 (2012).
88. See, e.g., David Hricik, Patent Agents: The Person You Are, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 261, 267–68 (2007).
89. Lawrence R. Richard, Psychological Type and Job Satisfaction Among Practicing
Lawyers in the United States, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 979, 981, 1027 (2002); Gidi Rubinstein &
Sally Strul, The Five Factor Model (FFM) Among Four Groups of Male and Female
Professionals, 41 J. RES. ON PERSONALITY 931, 932 (2007).
90. Paul Van R. Miller, Personality Differences and Student Survival in Law School, 19
J. LEGAL EDUC. 460, 465 (1967); Vernellia R. Randall, The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator,
First Year Law Students and Performance, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 63, 91–92 (1995).
91. Randall, supra note 90, at 96.
92. Landsman & McNeel, supra note 79, at 904.
93. Id. at 914.
94. Leigh Jones, Cheating 2.0: Law Schools Confront New Twists on a Venerable
Temptation, NAT’L L.J., May 25, 2009, at 1. It should be noted that the response rate was 13
percent, which is low. Donald L. McCabe et al., Academic Dishonesty in Graduate Business
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and the 54 percent of engineering students who reported cheating,95 the
lower rate reported by law students may have been due to concerns about
the consequences for bar admission if they were caught.96 This amount of
cheating in law school is troubling, as there appears to be a relationship
between academic cheating and dishonest behaviors in the workplace.97
Personality testing of lawyers is consistent with the findings about law
students. MBTI preferences for lawyers are significantly different from
those found in the general population.98 Like law students, lawyers tend to
be “thinking” and “judging” types rather than “feeling” and “perceiving”
They prefer introversion to extraversion and are less
types.99
interpersonally oriented,100 which is likely to affect the quality of
communication between lawyers and clients.101 This may account for why
clients sometimes express greater satisfaction with assistance from lay
specialists than from lawyers.102
Lawyers also appear to be less resilient than other people.103 Resilience
is characterized as the ability to bounce back quickly from criticism,
rejection, or setbacks by flexible adaptation to changing demands or
stressful experiences.104 Resilient individuals have optimistic approaches
to life, higher self-worth, better coping skills, and positive emotions even in
Programs: Prevalence, Causes and Proposed Action, 5 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING EDUC.
294, 297 (2006).
95. Emily Sachar, MBA Students Cheat More Than Other Grad Students, Study Finds,
BLOOMBERG.COM (Sept. 25, 2006), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive
&sid=aw7s9m0BmcBo; see also McCabe et al., supra note 94, at 299.
96. See Lucia Graves, Which Types of Students Cheat Most?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT (Oct. 3, 2008), http://www.usnews.com/education/articles/2008/10/03/which-typesof-students-cheat-most.
97. Sarath Nonis & Cathy Owens Swift, An Examination of the Relationship Between
Academic Dishonesty and Workplace Dishonesty: A Multicampus Investigation, 77 J. BUS.
EDUC. 69, 75 (2001); Randi L. Sims, The Relationship Between Academic Dishonesty and
Unethical Business Practices, 68 J. BUS. EDUC. 207, 209–10 (1993).
98. Richard, supra note 89, at 1015–17, 1029.
99. Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney
Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1392–93 (1997); Richard,
supra note 89, at 1029.
100. Daicoff, supra note 99, at 1394; Richard, supra note 89, at 1017, 1029; Larry
Richard & Lisa Roher, A Breed Apart? How Personality Characteristics Influence Who
Becomes a Lawyer—and How Far They Rise, AM. LAW., July/Aug. 2011, at 43–44.
101. Richard, supra note 89, at 1042.
102. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON LEGAL
TECHNICIANS 14 (1990) (noting that while 64 percent of those who received assistance from
lawyers were happy overall with the service, 76 percent of those who received nonlawyer
assistance were happy with the service); Moorhead et al., supra note 72, at 784 (noting
somewhat higher satisfaction among nonlawyers’ clients than solicitors’ clients).
103. The average for this trait among the public is the fiftieth percentile; among lawyers,
the average is the thirtieth percentile. Many lawyers score below 10 percent. LARRY
RICHARD, HERDING CATS: THE LAWYER PERSONALITY REVEALED 7, available at
http://www.managingpartnerforum.org/tasks/sites/mpf/assets/image/MPF%20-%20Herding
%20Cats%20-%20Richard%20-%203-5-121.pdf.
104. Dmitry M. Davydov et al., Resilience and Mental Health, 30 CLINICAL PSYCHOL.
REV. 479, 481 (2010); Michele M. Tugade & Barbara L. Frederickson, Resilient Individuals
Use Positive Emotions To Bounce Back from Negative Emotional Experiences, 86 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 320, 320 (2004).
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the face of stress;105 low-resilience individuals score high on emotional
instability and low on agreeableness and openness to experience.106 People
who are low on resilience tend to be defensive and resistant to feedback.107
They may also be predisposed toward anxiety and chronic dysphoria.108
Low resilience may be a predictor of depressive symptoms109 and may
help explain why lawyers suffer from elevated levels of depression and
psychological disorders beyond that found in the nonlawyer population.110
Individuals with low resilience may find it difficult to cope with law school
and the pressures of practice.111 A study in the 1980s found the prevalence
of major depressive disorders in U.S. lawyers was 10 percent, which was
one of the highest overall prevalence rates among all occupations and
substantially higher than the 3 to 5 percent found among the general
population.112 Two other studies revealed that more than 20 percent of the
lawyers surveyed manifested significant symptoms of depression and that
they did so at a rate far greater than would be expected in the general
population.113 In one of those studies, many male lawyers also reported
interpersonal sensitivity (30.2 percent),114 anxiety (27.8 percent), social
alienation and isolation (24.6 percent), paranoid ideation (13.2 percent), and
a Global Severity Index (18.3 percent) at a significantly higher rate than the
105. Maureen Davey et al., Resilience Processes in Adolescents: Personality Profiles,
Self-Worth, and Coping, 18 J. ADOLESCENT RES. 347, 348, 358 (2003); Tugade &
Frederickson, supra note 104, at 320.
106. See Davey et al., supra note 105, at 354–55. Low resilience also has a relationship
to neuroticism, which encompasses a proneness to negative emotions and difficulty coping.
L. Campbell Sills et al., Relationship of Resilience to Personality, Coping, and Psychiatric
Symptoms in Young Adults, 44 BEHAV. & RES. THERAPY 585, 593 (2006).
107. See RICHARD, supra note 103, at 7.
108. Jack Block & Adam M. Kremen, IQ and Ego-Resiliency: Conceptual and Empirical
Connections and Separateness, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 349, 351 (1996).
109. Odin Hjemdal et al., Resilience As a Predictor of Depressive Symptoms: A
Correlational Study with Young Adolescents, 12 CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY
91, 99 (2007).
110. See Connie J.A. Beck et al., Lawyer Distress: Alcohol-Related Problems and Other
Psychological Concerns Among a Sample of Practicing Lawyers, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 1
(1995). This is also true in other countries. See, e.g., NORM KELK ET AL., COURTING THE
BLUES: ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEPRESSION IN AUSTRALIAN LAW STUDENTS AND LEGAL
PRACTITIONERS 37 (2009), available at http://www.cald.asn.au/docs/Law%20Report%
20Website%20version%204%20May%2009.pdf.
111. Prior to entering law school, law students experience approximately the same levels
of distress and depression as the normal population. G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Role
of Legal Education in Producing Psychological Distress Among Law Students, 1986 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 225, 246; see also Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence S. Krieger, Does Legal
Education Have Undermining Effects on Law Students? Evaluating Changes in Motivation,
Values, and Well-Being, 22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 261, 267, 270 (2004) (reporting that on the
first day of law school students evidenced higher positive affect and life satisfaction than
undergraduates). Shortly after beginning law school, students’ psychological symptoms
emerged, and remained elevated beyond the level found in the normal population even after
graduation. See, e.g., Beck et al., supra note 110, at 45; Benjamin et al., supra, at 240, 248.
112. William W. Eaton et al., Occupations and the Prevalence of Major Depressive
Disorder, 32 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 1079, 1081 (1990).
113. Beck et al., supra note 110, at 18.
114. “Interpersonal sensitivity” included feelings of inferiority to others, selfconsciousness, and easily hurt feelings. Beck et al., supra note 110, at 54–55.
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average adult population.115 The study’s authors noted, “Although the data
are not sufficient to suggest that psychological distress has detrimentally
affected the lawyers’ ability to practice competently, the warning signs are
present.”116
Lawyers may also abuse alcohol more than the general population of
employed workers.117 One study in the 1980s found that 18 percent of
Washington State lawyers may have alcohol-related problems.118 The
actual level of alcohol abuse and addiction is not clear.119 Discipline
authorities report a high rate of depression and substance abuse among
lawyers who are disciplined.120 The evidence that there is a higher rate of
depression—and possibly alcohol problems—among lawyers than in the
general population suggests lawyers may be less trustworthy than they
claim.
B. Lawyers, Cognitive Biases, and Ethical Decisionmaking
Lawyers are not immune from the cognitive biases that affect all human
judgment. This may seem surprising, in light of evidence that most lawyers
are “thinkers” on the MBTI and often pride themselves on being “rational”
and objective.
Yet much ethical decisionmaking appears to be
nonconscious and intuitive rather than conscious and deliberate.121
Moreover, even when people consciously engage in decisionmaking, they
are not objective information processors.122 The brightest, most competent

115. Id. at 23–24. The Global Severity Index measures the intensity of the psychological
distress being experienced. Id. at 15. Women lawyers also reported elevated levels on these
measures, but not as high as men. Id. at 2.
116. Id.
117. G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Prevalence of Depression, Alcohol Abuse, and
Cocaine Abuse Among United States Lawyers, 13 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 233, 235, 241
(1990).
118. Id. at 241.
119. The Washington study relies on the Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test-Revised
score, which indicates that an alcohol problem is likely. Id. at 241. This is not the same as
finding that there was alcoholism or alcohol dependency. Beck et al., supra note 110, at 50.
Another study conducted during the same period indicated that the rate of alcohol abuse or
dependence among lawyers was 9.42 percent, which was slightly less than the prevalence in
the general labor force. Frederick S. Stinson et al., Prevalence of DSM-III-R Alcohol Abuse
and/or Dependence Among Selected Occupations, 16 ALCOHOL HEALTH & RES. WORLD 165,
167–68 (1992).
120. See Rick B. Allan, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse and Lawyers: Are We Ready To
Address the Denial?, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 265, 268 (1997); Cynthia L. Spanhel, The
Impact of Impaired Attorneys on the Texas Grievance Process, 52 TEX. B.J. 312, 312
(1989); Stephen Anderson, New Data Link Mental Impairment with Discipline, ISBA B.
NEWS, March 1, 1994, at 2.
121. See LINDA KLEBE TREVIÑO & GARY R. WEAVER, MANAGING ETHICS IN BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 160–61 (2003); Fiery Cushman et al., The Role of Conscious Reasoning and
Intuition in Moral Judgment: Testing Three Principles of Harm, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1082,
1087–88 (2006); Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social
Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 822 (2001).
122. George Loewenstein, Behavioral Decision Theory and Business Ethics: Skewed
Trade-Offs Between Self and Other, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO
BUSINESS ETHICS 214, 221 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996).
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people—including lawyers—are susceptible to cognitive biases even as
they continue to believe in their own objectivity.123 When lawyers’
personal characteristics are coupled with the demands of law practice and
certain cognitive biases, they may become susceptible to poor ethical
decisionmaking.124
Most individuals see themselves as better than average in many respects:
for example, more objective, more competent, and more ethical.125 It is not
difficult to imagine how lawyers may be especially susceptible to these selfserving biases. They are trained to approach problems in an objective,
competent, and ethical manner and pride themselves on doing so.
Cognitive biases also cause individuals to see themselves as more deserving
than others, and to resolve ambiguity and questions about fairness in selfinterested ways.126 This can be especially problematic for lawyers, who
constantly confront factual and legal ambiguity, but receive only limited
assistance from the rules of professional conduct in resolving ambiguity
because the rules themselves are often ambiguous.127
The overconfidence bias facilitates many of these other biases by making
people more confident in their judgments than is warranted by objective
facts.128 Overconfidence has been found in a variety of experts, including
lawyers, and especially where the issues are personally relevant.129
Overconfidence causes people to think that they are making good choices
and that they do not need to reconsider how to approach decisions they have
123. MAX H. BAZERMAN & DON A. MOORE, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION
MAKING 1 (8th ed. 2013).
124. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities
Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 647–49
(1997); Leslie C. Levin, Bad Apples, Bad Lawyers or Bad Decisionmaking: Lessons from
Psychology and from Lawyers in the Dock, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1549, 1570–73 (2009);
Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 941,
952–53, 957, 982 (2007); Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral Legal
Ethics, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1124–36, 1140–44 (2013).
125. David Alain Armor, The Illusion of Objectivity: Bias in the Belief in Freedom from
Bias, at 57–58 (1998) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California Los Angeles) (on file with
Fordham Law Review); see also Nicholas Epley & David Dunning, Feeling “Holier Than
Thou”: Are Self-Serving Assessments Produced by Errors in Self- or Social Prediction?, 79
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 861, 862 (2000); Emily Pronin et al., Objectivity in the Eye of the
Beholder: Divergent Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781,
793 (2004).
126. See BAZERMAN & MOORE, supra note 123, at 113–14, 200; Loewenstein, supra note
122, at 222.
127. See Lynn Mather & Leslie C. Levin, Why Context Matters, in LAWYERS IN
PRACTICE, supra note 33, at 3, 12.
128. See BAZERMAN & MOORE, supra note 123, at 15; SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 217–20 (1993); Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The
Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411,
411 (1992).
129. Willem A. Wagenaar & Gideon B. Keren, Does the Expert Know? The Reliability of
Predictions and Confidence Ratings of Experts, in INTELLIGENT DECISION SUPPORT IN
PROCESS ENVIRONMENTS 87, 100–01 (Erik Hollnagel et al. eds., 1986); see Derek J. Koehler
et al., The Calibration of Expert Judgment: Heuristics and Biases Beyond the Laboratory, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 128, at 686,
706.
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previously made.130 Once judgments are made, confirmation bias causes
people to see confirming evidence of their decisions as more relevant than
evidence that disconfirms the correctness of their choices.131 After they
have committed to a course of action, they prefer to act in ways that are
consistent with past conduct, in part because they do not wish to consider—
or admit to others—that they have made a mistake.132 These psychological
processes (and others) can give rise to ethical blind spots that interfere with
the ability to resolve ethical issues appropriately.
Lawyers are as susceptible to these ethical blind spots as anyone else.133
In fact, the conditions of law practice may exacerbate the likelihood of
certain biased decisionmaking. People rely on intuitive reasoning—which
is often skewed by cognitive biases—when they are busy and rushed.134
Unethical decisions are more common when the decisionmaker is under
time pressure, sleep deprived, or cognitively taxed.135 These are the
conditions under which much of law practice occurs.
Moreover, many lawyers have low resilience and rate high on
interpersonal sensitivity,136 which may make them in particular need of ego
protection. The ego has been compared to a totalitarian state “in which
unflattering or undesirable facts are suppressed in the interest of selfenhancement.”137 This occurs because people need to see themselves as
good and reasonable, and they subconsciously distort evidence to bolster or

130. See BAZERMAN & MOORE, supra note 123, at 15.
131. ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 188–90 (7th ed. 1995); PLOUS, supra note
128, at 234; Scott Sonenshein, The Role of Construction, Intuition, and Justification in
Responding to Ethical Issues at Work: The Sensemaking-Intuition Model, 32 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 1022, 1031 (2007).
132. See BAZERMAN & MOORE, supra note 123, at 104–05; ROBERT B. CIALDINI,
INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 52–53 (5th ed. 2009); Richard W. Painter, Convergence
and Competition in Rules Governing Lawyers and Auditors, 29 J. CORP. L. 397, 415 n.62
(2004); Barry M. Staw, The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action, 6 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 577, 580–81, 583–84 (1981).
133. BAZERMAN & MOORE, supra note 123, at 154; Levin, supra note 124, at 1566–70;
Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 124, at 1129–30, 1146.
134. BAZERMAN & MOORE, supra note 123, at 3, 23; see also Moorhead, supra note 59, at
19–21 (noting other ways in which lawyers are subconsciously primed that may adversely
affect their ethical decisionmaking).
135. Michael S. Christian & Aleksander P. K. Ellis, Examining the Effects of Sleep
Deprivation on Workplace Deviance: A Self-Regulatory Perspective, 54 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
913, 925–26 (2011); Francesca Gino et al., Unable To Resist Temptation: How Self-Control
Depletion Promotes Unethical Behavior, 115 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
191, 199 (2011); Shaul Shalvi et al., Honesty Requires Time (and Lack of Justifications), 23
PSYCHOL. SCI. 1264, 1265 (2012).
136. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
137. BAZERMAN & MOORE, supra note 123, at 90 (7th ed. 2009).
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maintain a positive self-image.138 The maintenance of self-esteem has been
described “as a fundamental human impulse.”139
As a result, once lawyers make a decision, they may be particularly
resistant to rethinking that decision, even when faced with evidence that
they may have made a mistake. People who are low on resilience “tend to
be defensive, resist taking in feedback, and can be hypersensitive to
criticism.”140 Thus, once lawyers have committed to a course of action,
they may find it very difficult to change it, not only because of
overconfidence and the confirmation bias, but because their need to protect
their egos will not allow it. Most people want to believe they have made
good decisions and to view themselves as consistent and competent
decisionmakers.141 Lawyers pride themselves on being especially good in
this regard. Evidence to the contrary may be discounted because of the
significant ego threat it presents.
It is important to note that there is no evidence that lawyers are more
likely than nonlawyers to make unethical decisions because of these
cognitive biases. Nor is there evidence that their low resilience, higher rates
of depression, or other personal characteristics make them less ethical than
other individuals. At the same time, there is scant evidence that their
personalities or other psychological characteristics make them superior in
their ethical decisions to nonlawyer representatives. On the contrary,
lawyers may be especially susceptible to cognitive biases that can adversely
affect their ethical judgments.
IV. MOVING BEYOND THE MONOPOLY
The legal profession’s claims about lawyers’ superiority rest largely on
rhetoric rather than on empirical evidence. They also rely on extreme
comparisons. No one seriously questions that an experienced securities
litigator is more competent to handle a federal securities lawsuit than an
untrained lay representative. The proper comparison is between the legal
outcomes achieved by lawyers and nonlawyer representatives (NLRs)—
such as patent agents or workers’ compensation representatives—who are
trained and licensed to work in a particular area of practice. Likewise, the

138. See Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation, 117
Q.J. ECON. 871, 872 (2002); Donald C. Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously: An Essay for
Lawyers, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1569, 1575 (2000); Mark R. Leary & Deborah L. Downs,
Interpersonal Functions of the Self-Esteem Motive: The Self-Esteem System As a
Sociometer, in EFFICACY, AGENCY, AND SELF-ESTEEM 123, 123–25 (Michael H. Kernis ed.,
1995).
139. Bénabou & Tirole, supra note 138, at 871; see also C. R. Snyder, Collaborative
Companions: The Relationship of Self-Deception and Excuse Making, in SELF-DECEPTION
AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING: NEW ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY 35, 36 (Mike W.
Martin ed., 1985).
140. RICHARD, supra note 103, at 7.
141. See Roderick M. Kramer & David M. Messick, Ethical Cognition and the Framing
of Organizational Dilemmas: Decision Makers As Intuitive Lawyers, in CODES OF CONDUCT,
supra note 122, at 59, 69–70; Claude M. Steele et al., Self-Image Resilience and Dissonance:
The Role of Affirmational Resources, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 885, 886 (1993).
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correct comparison is not between the trustworthiness of lawyers and
unregulated nonlawyers who are operating illegally. The comparison
should be between lawyers and NLRs who are subject to discipline if they
engage in misconduct. While it is not yet possible to prove, based on the
existing studies, that NLRs are as effective or trustworthy as lawyers
working in certain fields, it is also not possible to prove the opposite. The
evidence that does exist in the United States and in countries where NLRs
provide substantial legal assistance does not indicate that the public is
significantly harmed as a result.142
In the absence of such evidence, the refusal to permit NLRs to provide
more legal services in the United States is hard to justify when low-income
individuals have so much unmet need for legal assistance.143 Legal
document preparers cannot fill this need because they cannot supply the
advice and representation that many need in connection with their important
legal problems.144 Arizona and California permit approved legal document
preparers who meet certain requirements to provide individuals with
general legal information and assist with filing and service of papers, but
they, too, cannot give legal advice.145 The expanded licensing of NLRs in a
variety of legal contexts is needed to increase access to justice for many
Americans.
The Washington Supreme Court has recently taken a step in this
direction, permitting nonlawyer limited license legal technicians to advise
clients in the area of family law.146 LLLTs will be permitted, inter alia, to
explain the relevancy of facts to clients, to inform clients about applicable
procedures and documents that must be filed, and to inform clients of the
anticipated course of the legal proceeding.147 LLLTs must have 3,000
142. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 cmt. c (2000)
(noting that experience in states that have allowed nonlawyers to provide legal services
“indicates no significant risk of harm to consumers of such services”); Moorhead et al.,
supra note 72, at 788; Deborah L. Rhode & Lucy Buford Ricca, Protecting the Profession or
the Public? Rethinking Unauthorized-Practice Enforcement, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587,
2595 (2014). But see DAVID J. MORRIS, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO,
REPORT OF APPOINTEE’S FIVE-YEAR REVIEW OF PARALEGAL REGULATION IN ONTARIO 17
(2012), available at http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/paralegal_
review/Morris_five_year_review-ENG.pdf (reporting that some independent paralegals in
Canada engage in unethical behavior). The primary problem seemed to be unethical
advertising practices. Id. It is unclear whether the public was harmed as a result or whether
the paralegals engaged in more unethical advertising practices than lawyers.
143. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. Court service centers in some states also
provide self-represented litigants with help completing forms, but they do not provide
advice. See, e.g., Court Service Centers, ST. CONN. JUD. BRANCH, http://www.jud.ct.gov/csc/
services.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
145. ARIZ. CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. § 7-208(E) (2007); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§§ 6402–06 (West 2003 & Supp. 2014).
146. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 28(D)–(E), available at http://www.courts.wa
.gov/court_rules/?fa=court_rules.rulesPDF&groupName=ga&setName=apr&pdf=1.
147. Id. R. 28(F). Washington expects to begin licensing LLLTs in late 2014 or early
2015. Limited License Legal Technicians (LLLT), WASH. ST. B. ASS’N,
http://www.wsba.org/Licensing-and-Lawyer-Conduct/Limited-Licenses/Legal-Technicians
(last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
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hours of prior law-related experience supervised by a lawyer and either
have an associate’s degree or forty-five hours of paralegal education.148
They must also receive fifteen hours of instruction in the area of family law,
pass an examination, demonstrate good moral character, and engage in
continuing legal education.149 LLLTs will be held to the ethical standards
of the LLLT Rules of Professional Conduct, subject to discipline for
misconduct, held to the same standard of care as a lawyer, and required to
carry malpractice insurance or to demonstrate their ability to respond to
damage claims.150
In certain respects, Washington’s LLLT requirements are more onerous
than the requirements to become a lawyer. Unlike LLLTs, lawyers are not
required to have any practice experience before representing clients on their
own. Lawyers are not required to take any courses in family law before
practicing in that area. Lawyers are not required to carry malpractice
insurance (except in Oregon), or prove that they have the financial ability to
respond to damages claims.151 Indeed, the only requirements to become a
lawyer that are more demanding than the LLLT requirements are the legal
education requirement and the more extensive bar examination requirement.
In light of this, it is hard to argue that Washington’s approach is
insufficiently protective of the public, especially given the limited legal
assistance that LLLTs can provide. LLLTs cannot write letters for clients
(unless reviewed by a lawyer), negotiate on behalf of clients, or appear in
courts or before other tribunals.152 If LLLTs are more extensively trained
in a single field and as highly regulated as lawyers, it is not clear why they
should not be permitted to do more for clients—including negotiate for
clients and appear in certain courts. In other words, it is not clear why they
should not be true nonlawyer representatives.
The idea that NLRs should be permitted to act as representatives for
individuals in certain matters—including in administrative proceedings and
in some courts—finds support in the United States, where approved
nonlawyers represent individuals before certain federal and state agencies,
and in other countries. For example, nonlawyers can represent claimants
before the U.S. Social Security Administration and recover a fee if they
pass an examination and meet other requirements.153 Licensed workers’
compensation representatives can represent claimants in some states if they
meet certain requirements, including passing an examination.154
Independent paralegals in Ontario, who must pass a licensing examination,
148. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 28(D)–(E).
149. Id. R. 28(D)–(E), (I); Practice Area Courses, WASH. ST. B. ASS’N,
http://www.wsba.org/Licensing-and-Lawyer-Conduct/Limited-Licenses/LegalTechnicians/Practice-Area-Courses#requirement (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
150. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 28(C)(3), (E)(4), (K).
151. 5 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 36:1, at 3–4
(2010).
152. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 28(H)(5). The exception is where other
nonlawyers are permitted to appear under WASH. GEN. R. 24(b) (2013).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 406(e)(2) (2006); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1705(b) (2014).
154. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12, § 302-1 (2013).
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can provide representation in small claims court and traffic court, and
before the Landlord and Tenant Board.155 Qualified nonlawyers in the
United Kingdom can represent individuals in immigration proceedings.156
The determination of when NLRs should be permitted to provide advice
and representation to clients should focus on the procedural complexity of
the forum, the substantive complexity of the law, and the likelihood of
consumer confusion. Thus, trained NLRs should be permitted to represent
individuals in courts of limited procedural complexity such as small claims
courts. The experiences in Canada and the United Kingdom suggest that
NLRs might also be licensed to represent individuals with respect to
somewhat more complex matters, such as landlord-tenant cases. The
wisdom of doing so would depend upon the complexity of the law and
procedures in the forum. At the same time, even though the United States
permits nonlawyer accredited representatives to represent clients in
immigration proceedings,157 this approach deserves careful scrutiny.
Immigration law is complex and immigrants often have difficulty
understanding the differences between lawyers and nonlawyer providers of
Accredited representatives, who can appear in
legal services.158
proceedings on behalf of immigrants, are not required to take an
examination or undergo any particular training.159 Unless NLRs can be
trained to provide competent representation in immigration proceedings,
and the different capabilities of lawyers and NLRs can be effectively
communicated to clients, nonlawyers should not be permitted to represent
clients in immigration matters unless they are supervised by a lawyer.
The introduction of more NLRs into the market for legal services has
associated costs, including the cost of regulation. In Washington, after an
infusion of over $220,000 from the Washington State Bar Association, the
cost of LLLT regulation is expected to be paid entirely through LLLT
certification and examination fees.160 NLRs should not, however, bear the
full cost of regulation if NLRs are then forced to charge rates that

155. Paralegal Frequently Asked Questions, L. SOC’Y UPPER CAN., http://lsuc.on.ca/
licensingprocessparalegal.aspx?id=2147491230 (last visited Apr. 26, 2014); see also
MORRIS, supra note 142, at 11.
156. OISC Level 3, Advocacy and Representation, OISC, http://oisc.homeoffice.gov.uk/
how_to_become_a_regulated_immigration_adviser/guidance_on_competence/oisc_level_3/
(last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
157. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
158. See Levin, supra note 33, at 89–91; Ann M. Simmons, Immigrants Exploited by
‘Notarios’: Officials Crack Down on Those Who Take Advantage of Confusion over the
Word, Which Can Mean “Lawyer,” L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2004, at B1.
159. See Medina, supra note 87, at 460, 469–70. Not surprisingly, the quality of
accredited representatives is reportedly mixed. See Careen Shannon, To License or Not To
License? A Look at Differing Approaches to Policing the Activities of Nonlawyer
Immigration Service Providers, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 452–54 (2011).
160. See Email from Thea Jennings, Wash. State Bar Ass’n LLLT Program Lead, to
author (Nov. 12, 2013, 15:14 EST) (on file with Fordham Law Review).
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individuals cannot afford. Some state funding may be needed, just as it is
needed for the administration of many state lawyer discipline systems.161
One other important cost that is not yet known is the rates that NLRs will
charge their clients. Theoretically, NLRs’ rates should be somewhat lower
than lawyers’ rates because NLRs do not incur the substantial cost (and
debt) associated with three years of law school. Moreover, if NLRs are
licensed only to work in a single area (e.g., family law), the limited scope of
the work should make it easier to organize their work efficiently and
provide it in a cost-effective manner. Nevertheless, NLRs would incur
many of the same ongoing expenses incurred by lawyers including office
space, computers, telephones, certification costs, and continuing legal
education. They may also incur some expenses—such as malpractice
insurance—that some other lawyers will not incur.162 Even if the entry of
NLRs into the legal services market forces the rates charged for certain
legal services downward, it remains to be seen whether those rates will be
affordable for low-income Americans.
If the entry of NLRs into the market for legal services causes the rates for
certain legal services to fall, this may represent the type of disruptive
innovation that will have significant market consequences.163 Disruptive
innovation occurs when the innovation targets new consumers or targets
existing consumers in ways that are not of interest to the market
incumbents.164 NLRs may create new consumers of legal services who
could not previously afford to pay for legal representation.165 At the same
time, they may drive lawyers out of less remunerative practice areas.166 At
a minimum, it seems likely that NLR entry into other areas will mean that
some lawyers will leave the field (or choose not to enter it) because it has
become less profitable. As the Washington Supreme Court noted, however,
when it decided to allow LLLTs to provide advice in the area of family law,
“[p]rotecting the monopoly status of attorneys in any practice area is not a
legitimate objective.”167

161. AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMM. ON PROF’L DISCIPLINE, 2009 ABA SURVEY ON
LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS chart VI (2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/discipline/2009sold.authcheckdam.pdf.
162. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
163. “Disruptive innovation” is a term used by Clayton Christenson that describes how
innovation can disrupt markets. Ray Worthy Campbell, Rethinking Regulation and
Innovation in the U.S. Legal Services Market, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 4–5, 9 (2012).
164. Id. at 10.
165. See id. at 11. Consistent with the theory of disruptive innovation, NLRs may also
address the needs of “overshot consumers” by replacing the supplier of legal services who
was more than a consumer needed (a lawyer) with a cheaper solution (an NLR) that might
meet their needs. Id. at 12–13.
166. See id. at 18–19 (noting that over time, as new entrants improve the quality of their
products, increasingly competing directly with incumbents, they may eventually drive the
incumbents from the market to the higher-end market that remains open to them).
167. In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal
Technicians, No. 25700-A-1005, slip op. at 7 (Wash. June 15, 2012).
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CONCLUSION
The legal profession has been remarkably effective in maintaining
control over the legal services market, notwithstanding the lack of evidence
that lawyers are more effective or ethical than trained and licensed
nonlawyers in certain legal contexts. Research suggests that “[t]he control
on entry into legal practice, years of legal education, and regulation of
conduct and competence have done little or nothing to distinguish lawyers
from their nonlawyer competitors.”168 Nevertheless, it is important to
proceed cautiously when opening up legal services markets to NLRs. Some
areas may not be appropriate for nonlawyer representation because of their
procedural or substantive complexity or the possibility of consumer
confusion.
The legal profession needs to decide what role to play in this market
transition. The elite bar has been open to efforts to allow nonlawyers to
provide more legal services to individuals,169 in part because nonlawyers
will not compete with them for high-end corporate work. Much of the rest
of the organized bar has attempted to block efforts to expand entry of
nonlawyer providers into the legal services market.170 While the bar can
continue to obstruct the opening of the legal market to NLRs, and may
continue to win some battles, it will eventually lose the war. In order to
prepare for the changes in the legal services market, the bar should instead
consider how to make the delivery of legal services more accessible and
cost-effective for consumers. The legal profession could also have a role
shaping, in constructive ways, the future training and responsibilities of
NLRs. If the bar attempts to cling to its monopoly, and does not engage
with these changes, those issues are likely to be resolved by courts,
legislatures, and the marketplace in ways that do not consider lawyers’
legitimate interests and concerns.

168. Moorhead et al., supra note 72, at 795.
169. See, e.g., COMM. ON PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, N.Y.C. BAR, NARROWING THE “JUSTICE
GAP”: ROLES FOR NONLAWYER PRACTITIONERS (2013), available at http://www2.nycbar.org/
pdf/report/uploads/20072450-RolesforNonlawyerPractitioners.pdf.
170. See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, supra note 78, at 68–70
(1995); Brooks Holland, The Washington State Limited License Legal Technician Practice
Rule: A National First in Access to Justice, 82 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 75, 101 (2013); Stephanie
S. Johnson, Florida Bar Board Rejects Proposals for Legal Technicians, B. LEADER, Nov.–
Dec. 1994, at 8; see also France, supra note 15.

